1. Introduction

Typically for good reason, many people see foreign aid being provided by the West to underdeveloped states as beneficial. In some cases foreign aid can certainly benefit poorer states especially after a natural disaster if the foreign aid is used properly. However, foreign aid unfortunately does not always benefit poorer states; as in some cases foreign aid can be used to harm countries economically. Specifically the conditionality of foreign aid can have a negative economic impact on states, as they have to accept money that they desperately need on conditions that they have to implement economic policies that harm their respective states. In this paper the argument will be made that the conditionality of foreign aid to Haiti from the West is keeping the country in a cycle of poverty and dependency. The West which in the context of this paper includes the United States, Canada, Western European states, and Western dominated International Organizations (IOs) like the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), plus the World Bank have been providing foreign aid to Haiti with conditions that harm the state’s economy. Unfortunately, Haiti feels it has no choice but to accept the foreign aid with conditions, instead of not accepting it at all and implementing the type of economic policies it wants to. In order for Haiti to improve its citizens standard of living the West is going to have to change the way it provides foreign aid with or without conditions to the state.

1. Haiti Background: Causes of Foreign Aid

Unfortunately, it is pretty well known that Haiti is one of the poorest states in the world, and is by far the poorest nation in the Western hemisphere. In 2012 the GDP Per Capita of Haiti, was only $1,300, which was not remotely close to the next poorest state in the Western Hemisphere, which was Nicaragua at $4,500 (CIA World Factbook: GDP Per Capita (PPP), 2013). Back in 1999 Haiti had a GDP of only $250 compared to the Latin American and Caribbean average of $3,320 (Mobekk & Spyrou, 2012, p.528). Four-fifths of the state’s citizens live below the poverty line, and over half live in extreme poverty (CIA World Factbook: Haiti, 2013). Only ten percent of Haiti’s population has access to electricity, while one-third of the population has no access to sanitation facilities, and half of the country has no access to clean water (Buss & Gardener, 2006, p.5). Haiti suffers from severe economic problems, as anywhere from fifty to seventy percent of the state’s population is unemployed, while “Ninety-five percent of employment in Haiti is in the underground economy…” (Buss & Gardener, 2006 p.5). Haiti also suffers from extreme economic inequality as half of the state’s wealth is controlled by Haitian elites, which only account for one percent of the state’s population (Hallward, 2010, p. 1). It is also important to note that these economic statistics were before the January 2010 earthquake that devastated Haiti and further worsened the state’s economic problems, as well as extreme poverty.

Extreme poverty is unfortunately not new to Haiti, as the country has dealt with extreme poverty throughout most of its history causing the state to be so dependent on foreign aid to begin with. Haiti is extremely dependent on foreign aid, as it consists of nearly seventy percent of the government budget (Hallward, 2010, p. 7). The state’s dependency on foreign aid puts it in a dangerous position where it may have to accept conditions to receiving foreign aid that harms the country. After Haiti became an independent state in the early 1800’s due to it being the first successful slave revolt in the Western Hemisphere, Western powers forced the country into economic isolation due in part to racial overtones. “The two international powers that did the most to isolate Haiti until the second half of the nineteenth century were the Vatican and the United States.” (Trouillot, 1990, p.51). Then once the U.S. finally recognized Haiti as a state in 1862, the U.S. exploited and controlled the Haitian market by selling many of its products at low prices to undercut competition to the country; however, the U.S. bought little products from Haiti in return (Trouillot, 1990, p.53-54). So economic isolation and then exploitation of Haiti by the West can be considered causes of why Haiti had been dependent on foreign aid throughout its history.

The U.S. also occupied Haiti for nearly two decades from 1915-1934, which worsened Haiti’s economic problems; as the Haitian state became dependent on exporting coffee and economic inequality was reinforced through the lower classes having to pay higher taxes than they had before the U.S. occupation (Trouillot, 1990, p. 16, 100, 102-103). The U.S. occupation of Haiti also resulted in economic and military power being more centralized in the capital of Port-au-Prince (Trouillot, 1990, p. 16-17, 104-105; Zanotti, 2011, p. 81). This centralization of power in the Haitian capital had disastrous consequences, as a few decades later Francois Duvalier (Papa Doc) and following him his son Jean-Claude Duvalier (Baby Doc) were dictators of Haiti for nearly thirty years until Baby Doc’s departure in 1986 (Trouillot, 1990, p. 16-17; Zanotti, 2011, p.81). So the U.S. occupation early in the twentieth century could be considered another contributing factor to why Haiti has been put in an economic situation where the country has to be dependent on foreign aid in order to survive.

Another important factor has forced Haiti into extreme poverty as well. Haiti is a state that has been plagued by corruption throughout most of its history, as when the word “failed state” is used Haiti is usually associated at the top of the list in that category with others states like Somalia in East Africa. “No Haitian chief of state has ever lived on his salary; every regime has enriched at least a few of the ministers and senators who served it. Similarly, Haitian governments have operated on the assumption that even a middle-level position within the state apparatus will be used for personal ends.” (Trouillot, 1990, p. 175). Political corruption unfortunately reached new heights during both Duvalier regimes, as the Duvalier family under Baby Doc embezzled U.S. foreign aid into their personal accounts overseas (Trouillot, 1990 p. 176, 211). “As of 2004, Haiti ranked in the bottom one percent of all countries on corruption and government effectiveness.”, while “Transparency International (TI) ranked Haiti, along with Bangladesh, as the most corrupt in the world in 2004.” (Buss & Gardener, 2006, p. 6). Haiti suffers from drug trafficking, gang violence, political violence, murders, and assassinations with few of the assailants being brought to justice for their crimes (Buss & Gardener, 2006, p.4, 6). It is important to note that Hallward (2010) in his book “Damming the Flood: Haiti and the Politics of Containment” argued that the West was responsible for promoting a lot of the violence in Haiti in order to overthrow Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and that he did not have the security resources to reduce crime in the state due to the West. While Hallward does have a valid point about the Aristide regime being undermined by the West, Haiti has had a history of corruption that would make other nations and IOs very reluctant to provide foreign aid to Haiti without conditions due to fear that the foreign aid would not be used properly.

A third important factor that has forced Haiti into extreme poverty and to become too dependent on foreign aid is that authoritarian regimes have ruled the state for most of its history. The first leader of Haiti democratically elected did not occur until 1957 when Papa Doc was voted into office (Zanotti, 2011, p.81). Unfortunately for the Haitian people, Papa Doc became a totalitarian dictator that controlled nearly all facets of Haitian society through using repressive force on everyone including women, children, churches, schools, villages, and even sports teams in order to remain in power (Trouillot, 1990, p. 167-168). Worse, the U.S. and others Western powers were tolerant of Papa Doc’s and then his son Baby Doc’s totalitarian regime, due to both leaders being anti-communist (Buss & Gardener, 2006, p.4; Hallward, 2010, p. 15; Trouillot, 1990, p.161-162).

Under Baby Doc’s totalitarian regime beginning in 1971, neo-liberal economic policies like structural adjustment programs, low taxes, low wages, tariff reductions, and abolishment of trade unions were implemented in order for Haiti to continue to retain Western support (Hallward, 2010, p. 15). These neo-liberal economic programs were recommended by Western institutions including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the World Bank (Hallward, 2010, p.15; Zanotti, 2011, p. 81). These neo-liberal economic policies implemented by Baby Doc with Western support had disastrous impacts on Haiti. These disastrous impacts include real wages falling by fifty percent from 1980 to 1990, food price increases, and starvation in the countryside (Hallward, 2010, p. 15; Zanotti, 2011, p. 82). Finally Western support began to wane for Baby Doc in the mid 1980’s as riots broke out throughout Haiti, and Haitian elites lost confidence in Baby Doc’s leadership as the Haitian economy continued to struggle mightily (Hallward, 2010, p.16; Zanotti, 2011, p. 82). The U.S. finally suspended aid payments to Baby Doc in January 1986, and the U.S. military decided to have him removed from power shortly thereafter in February 1986 (Hallward, 2010, p. 16; Zanotti, 2011, p. 82). The nearly decades of totalitarian rule by the Duvalier’s put Haiti in an extremely tenable position where the state would have to be dependent on foreign aid in order to survive.

1. Foreign Aid provided to Haiti: Statistics

Before the conditionality of foreign aid to Haiti is addressed in the next section of the paper, it is important to look at who is providing foreign aid and how much foreign aid is being given to Haiti. Foreign countries and IO’s have had a history of pledging a lot of money to Haiti; however, only a small portion of that money actually makes it to the state. From 1990 to 2005, the U.S. provided just under $1.5 billion dollars in foreign aid to the Haitian state (Buss & Gardener, 2006, p.7). The U.S. has also had wide fluctuations in the amount of aid they give to Haiti on a yearly basis, as, “US aid, for instance, grew from $58 million in 1990 to $159 million in 1995, and fell back to $54.6 million in 2004.” (Einsiedel & Malone, 2006, p. 162). It is also important to note that U.S. aid given to Haiti was considerably lower than American aid given to other conflict prone regions like Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990’s (Einsiedel & Malone, 2006, p. 162).

In 2004 the West pledged to grant or loan foreign aid to Haiti as the U.S. pledged $207 million, the World Bank pledged $150 million, Canada pledged $88 million, and France pledged $33 million (Buss & Gardener, 2006, p. 8). That year a total of $1.3 billion dollars was pledged to the Haiti; however, only $242 million dollars actually made it to the state (Einsiedel & Malone, 2006, p. 167). Since the 2010 Earthquake in Haiti the U.S. has pledged over $1.15 billion dollars to Haiti, Spain has pledged $ 449.4 million dollars, Canada has pledged $387.1 million, the World Bank had pledged $359.2 million, and France has pledged $279.7 million dollars (Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, 2012, p.1). Perhaps a little surprising is that the U.S. is not the highest pledged donor of foreign aid to Haiti, as Venezuela pledged over $2.42 billion dollars to the state since 2010 (Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, 2012, p.1). After the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, over nine billion dollars of foreign aid was pledged to the state to help it recover from the natural disaster; however, only around $2.5 billion of that pledged money actually made it to Haiti (Beaubien, 2013). Also, most of that money that did make it to Haiti ended up going to the UN, NGO’s, and not the Haitian government (Beaubien, 2013).

There have also been instances during Haiti’s history where foreign aid has been suspended or an international embargo has been placed on the state for a multitude of reasons. Some of these reasons for the suspension of foreign aid include human rights abuses, corruption, or a regime the West does not support in general. Papa Doc had foreign aid from the U.S. suspended under President Kennedy in protest of him killings thousands of his own citizens; however, foreign aid was reinstated by President Nixon once Baby Doc assumed power after his father’s death (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012, p. 1). Already mentioned earlier in the paper, foreign aid from the U.S. was finally suspended to Baby Doc in January; as his regime was becoming more repressive and U.S. government officials were losing confidence in his leadership (Hallward, 2010, p. 16; Zanotti, 2011, p. 82). Also, another factor that may have been involved in that aid suspension and less support for Baby Doc in general was that U.S.-Soviet relations were beginning to improve by 1986. There was probably less of an American or Western concern of Haiti becoming a communist state under Soviet or Cuban influence. Once, Aristide was elected into office in 1990, worldwide foreign aid to Haiti rose to $380 million, and then once Aristide was overthrown by military general Raul Cedras foreign aid was suspended by the U.S. under President George H.W. Bush (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012, p. 2).

In 1993 the UN Security Council imposed an oil and weapons embargo on Haiti due to Cedras’s military dictatorship (Einsiedel & Malone, 2006, p. 155). The UN Security Council also imposed a naval blockade on Haiti in 1994, and was lifted later that year when Jean-Bertrand Aristide was brought back intro power by the West (Einsiedel & Malone, 2006, p. 155-156). After Aristide was reelected to the Haitian Presidency for a second time in 2000, the U.S. imposed an aid embargo again on the state (Farmer, 2008, p. 404; Hallward, 2010, p. 82). The cut in foreign aid to Haiti had a devastating impact on the state, as while the Haitian state was receiving around $600 million dollars in foreign aid in 1995, the total budget of the Haitian government by 2003 was only $300 million (Hallward, 2010, p.82). One-fifth of that $300 million dollar budget went toward repaying Haiti’s debt that the Duvalier’s were primarily responsible for, and Haiti’s budget was only the equivalent of a small U.S. city like Roanoke, Virginia (Hallward, 2010, p. 82-83). The fluctuations and suspension of foreign aid to Haiti during the past few decades have certainly hurt its citizens. It has forced Haiti to be more willing to agree to certain conditions in order to keep receiving foreign aid from the West that results in negative impact on the Haitian people.

1. Examples of the Conditionality of Foreign Aid to Haiti

In the latter half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, there have been multiple examples of the West imposing conditions on foreign aid coming into Haiti that has resulted in negative impacts on the state. These conditions to foreign aid have resulted in Haiti remaining impoverished, dependent, and even in some cases undermined democratic institutions in the state. While an argument is not being made that there should be no conditions to foreign aid going to Haiti or others states to prevent corruption, these examples of conditions being put on foreign aid to Haiti had little to do with preventing corruption or helping people in poverty. Instead these conditions forced Haiti to impose a neo-liberal economic agenda that in some cases went against the wishes of the Haitian people. While the U.S. has been involved, if not primarily responsible for the conditionality of foreign aid to Haiti, other Western nations like France and Canada, as well as IO’s like the UN, World Bank, and IMF have been involved in imposing conditions on foreign aid that harm the Haitian state as well.

Before some examples are shown of conditionality being used in foreign aid to Haiti that results in harm to its citizens, it is important to talk about the concept of conditionality. There are multiple ways a donor state or IO can impose conditionality on the state that is receiving the foreign aid (Buss & Gardener, 2006, p. 16). One, the donor state or IO can target foreign aid toward a particular issue and the country receiving the foreign aid must adopt the program instituted by the donor government to address that issue in order to receive their aid. Two, the donor state or IO can adopt benchmarks that the state receiving the foreign aid has to meet in order to continue to receive aid from the donor state or IO (Buss & Gardener, 2006, p. 16). Third, if state receiving foreign aid fails to solve the issue the aid was intended to address in the first place, then the donor country can reduce or completely cut off aid. Finally donor states can institute something known as aid tying, in which in order to receive foreign aid the state receiving the aid has to buy goods and/or services from the donor state in order to receive the aid (Buss & Gardener, 2006, p. 16). While these conditions for foreign aid have their place in certain circumstances, in the examples about to be discussed these conditions on foreign aid have had devastating impacts on Haiti.

One major example of conditions being put on foreign aid to Haiti that resulted in in negative impacts on the Haitian state for several decades was during the totalitarian rule of Papa Doc and especially his son Baby Doc. As discussed earlier in the paper, the West including the U.S. had little problem with both Duvalier’s remaining in power as long as they implemented neo-liberal economic policies and most importantly kept Haiti anti-communist (Buss & Gardener, 2006, p.4; Hallward, 2010, p. 15; Trouillot, 1990, p.161-162). Papa Doc did implement a few redistribute economic policies during his reign; however, these policies by no means promoted communism, and instead promoted citizen loyalty to Papa Doc by literally buying people off in order to remain in power (Trouillot, 1990, p. 154-156; Zanotti, p. 81). “By 1970, foreign assistance was 70% of the Haitian national treasury revenues; aid levels rose to $35.5 million in 1975.”, however, “Large-scale corruption meant that this aid never reached the Haitian people and the economic situation remained largely unchanged.” (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012, p. 2). The U.S. “…continued to provide the country with aid…”, since they were, “…an ally in the fight against communism.” (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012, p. 1).

During the Duvalier era in Haiti, the conditionality of foreign aid to that state resulted in disastrous consequences for Haitian citizens. The condition for foreign of having the Duvalier’s, especially under Baby Doc implement neo-liberal economic policies did not improve the quality of life of Haiti’s citizens. The other condition for foreign aid in that Haiti remains an anti-communist state was probably the one that may have been more devastating for Haiti. The West could probably tolerate the Duvalier’s implementing more centrist economic policies like under Papa Doc; however, like other states in Latin American and the Caribbean they would not tolerate Haiti becoming a communist state. This condition for foreign aid was probably too easy of a benchmark for the Duvalier’s to accept, as they had no problem remaining anti-communist as long as they received their foreign aid and remained in power. The conditionality of remaining anti-communist in order to receive foreign aid resulted in extreme government corruption and severe human rights abuses being overlooked. An argument could be made that the wrong conditions were imposed on foreign aid going to Haiti. It is understandable that the U.S. and other Western nations did not want Haiti to become a communist state; however, foreign aid to the Duvalier regime could have been attached with conditions that prevented government corruption and human rights abuses as well. By the time the West finally began to crackdown on Baby Doc’s repressive regime in the 1980’s the damage had already been done to Haiti, where future leaders would have to continue to be dependent on the West for foreign aid with conditions that ultimately did more harm than good to Haiti’s citizens.

Another major example of conditions being put on foreign aid to Haiti that resulted in negative impacts on the state was during the Presidency of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in the 1990’s and early 2000’s. Aristide was elected to the Haitian Presidency in December 1990 with sixty-seven percent of the vote in elections overseen by the international community (Hallward, 2010, p.32; Zanotti, 2011, p. 82). Aristide was quite different from previous Haitian leaders, as he believed in a concept known as liberation theology. Liberation theology is a political, economic, and religious movement started by a segment of the Catholic Church that believed in working to promote social justice by helping the poor through the redistribution of wealth (Hallward, 2010, p. 19; Zanotti, 2011, p. 82-83). Aristides’s promotion of liberation theology did not please Haitian elites or Western governments like the U.S., as Hallward even makes the argument that the CIA was involved in the first overthrow of Aristide in 1991 (Hallward, 2010, p.20; Zanotti, 2011, p. 83). Aristide was eventually, “…brought back to power by the UN in 1994.” (Zanotti, 2011, p. 83).

It was when Aristide returned to Haiti in the mid 1990’s that the West really began to impose foreign aid on him with conditions that harmed Haiti’s citizens. As a condition of his return to Haiti and in order to receive foreign aid Aristide had to sign an agreement known as the Paris Plan (Hallward, 2010, p. 50-51). The Paris Plan involved Aristide having to give amnesty to the people responsible for the 1991 coup as well as human rights violations and share power with the people he defeated in earlier elections (Hallward, 2010, p. 50-51). Aristide was also, “…required to implement a drastic new structural adjustment program…” (Hallward, 2010, p. 51). “In exchange for some $770 million dollars in promised aid and loans, the list of concessions appears calamitous: tariffs were to be “drastically” reduced, wages frozen, around half of the civil service to be laid off, and all nine of Haiti’s remaining public utilities (telephone, electricity, port, airport, cement, flour, a cooking oil plant and two state banks) were to be sold off.” (Hallward, 2010, p. 56). Haiti was also being pressured by the West to privatize state-owned enterprise as a condition of receiving foreign aid, especially from the IMF (Buss & Gardener, 2006, p.18; Hallward, 2010, p. 58; Mobekk and Spyrou, 2012, p. 531). When Aristide returned to Haiti as President, he refused to privatize state-owned entities (Hallward, 2010, p.59).

These new concessions Aristide agreed to in order to receive foreign aid harmed Haiti’s economy. Hallward (2010) argues this point throughout his book, plus Mobekk and Spyrou (2012) argue throughout their article “Re-evaluating IMF involvement in low-income countries: the case of Haiti” that IMF policies in Haiti have not helped the state economically. Obviously, Aristide did not want to implement these new neo-liberal economic policies; however, he felt he had little choice but to do so in order to receive the foreign aid Haiti desperately needed (Hallward, 2010, p. 57). When Haiti under President Aristide as well as his elected successor Rene Preval did not meet the conditions for receiving foreign aid the West did suspend or cut that aid altogether. Preval was willing to privatize a few of the state-owned entities, and those efforts did not help the Haitian economy at all (Buss & Gardener, 2006, p. 18; Hallward, 2010, p.59). Despite Preval’s attempts to cooperate with the West in privatizing more so than Aristide during his Presidency, significant amounts of foreign aid were cut or withheld from Haiti in the late 1990’s due to Preval not going far enough in his privatization efforts (Hallward, 2010, p.64; Mobekk & Spyrou, 2012, p. 529-530).

By the time Aristide was re-elected to another term as President in Haiti in 2000, as discussed earlier in the paper nearly all foreign aid was cut off to Haiti through an imposed aid embargo (Farmer, 2008, p. 404; Hallward, 2010, p. 82). Hallward (2010) even goes on to argue that the West began to provide foreign aid to shady and undemocratic organizations with Haitian elite ties in order to overthrow Aristide. He argues that, “…most of the international money Aristide had fought so hard to secure during his Washington exile was in fact used in 1994-95 to undermine his government and much of what it sought to achieve.” (Hallward, 2010, p.60). Hallward further argues that, “Most of it went straight to pro-elite, pro-US, pro-business private sector groups whose political opposition to Lavalas was already explicit.” (Hallward, 2010, p. 60). While this argument may be highly contested, foreign aid was certainly not going to Aristides government. With Western support, Aristide was overthrow again in 2004 (Zanotti, 2011, p. 83). Aristides’s attempts to go against the conditions set for foreign aid just didn’t result in an aid embargo; it resulted in him being removed from power.

In general, a final condition on foreign aid going to Haiti that has a harmful effect on the state’s economy, and its citizens is aid tying. The U.S. and other nations as well have required Haiti throughout its history to buy the donor states products as a condition for receiving foreign aid (Buss & Gardener, 2006, p.17). Aid tying has also required Haiti to receive technical assistance from the donor country or have the foreign aid transported on the donor states ships (Buss & Gardener, 2006, p.17-18). While some of the aid tying may have good intentions, this condition has negatively affected Haiti as well. Aid tying has caused the U.S. to be able take advantage of Haiti by dumping agricultural products on the Haitian market, resulting in thousands of Haitian farmers losing jobs (Hallward, 2010, p. 5-6). Aid tying has also made building Haitian government capacity more difficult (Buss & Gardener, 2006, p.17).

1. Potential Solutions to the Conditionality of Foreign Aid

While the cases of conditionality being used for foreign aid to Haiti and resulting in harmful effects on the state’s citizens mentioned earlier is pretty clear, the solutions to this problem are not as clear. There is no clear cut solution to conditionality that is going fix this problem in Haiti in the long-term. There does not seem as much literature out there that deals with; how to go about dealing with the conditionality of foreign aid to Haiti. There are a lot of other problems with foreign aid being currently being given to Haiti, other than conditionality. These include foreign aid not be distributed properly, foreign aid not making it to where it is needed, and foreign aid going to NGO’s, which can undermine the capacity of the Haitian government. So even if the problem of conditionality to foreign aid to Haiti is solved, it would not come close to solving of all Haiti’s problems. However despite this, there are ways that the problem of conditionality of foreign aid to Haiti can be addressed that help improve the state’s future.

One, conditionality should not be used for foreign aid to Haiti to implement an economic program that the state and a majority of its citizens do not want. Whether or not Aristide was an authoritarian leader is a subject of great debate. However, the people of Haiti overwhelmingly elected him into office twice. Most of the country wanted him to implement economic policies that they thought would improve their quality of life. The West is a big proponent of democracy and should not interfere with democratic processes through attaching conditions to foreign aid that undermine the will of the Haitian people. Neo-liberal economics may work for some countries; however, “…one cannot readily assume that de-regulating and liberalizing the economy is the right policy for low-income countries.” (Mobekk & Spyrou, 2012, p. 535). Providing foreign aid with conditions that hurts Haiti’s citizens also does not make financial sense for the West, as they will have to provide more foreign aid in the future to attempt to solve the problems the foreign aid with conditions was not able to solve before. It may even be possible for the West to provide less foreign aid without neo-liberal economic conditions to a country in return for letting them implement the economic policy that their citizens want.

Two, aid tying as a form of conditionality for foreign aid to Haiti should not be used in most circumstances. Aid tying may be benefit the donor state; however, in many cases it hurts the state receiving the foreign aid like Haiti (Buss & Gardener, 2006, p. 27). Finally, there are situations where conditionality for foreign should be used; however, those situations should be thought out carefully. Conditionality could have been used on foreign aid during the dictatorship of the Duvalier’s to force them to respect human rights and fight government corruption, instead of it being used to keep Haiti anti-communist at the expense of the Haitian people. However, even in these situations conditionality may not be appropriate, as an oppressive government may be willing to not receive foreign aid in order to remain in power at the expense of their citizens (Buss & Gardener, 2006, p. 27).

1. Conclusion

Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century and first decade of the twenty-first century the conditionality of foreign aid Haiti has not benefitted its citizens at all or alleviated poverty in the state. Instead many of the conditions have harmed its citizens for different reasons. These reasons include allowing human rights violations and corruption to continue under the Duvalier’s, promoting economic policies that are likely not in the best interest of Haiti at the time, as well as making Haiti continue to be dependent on more foreign aid in the future. While there is not an easy solution to making sure foreign aid is effectively utilized in Haiti, putting certain conditions on foreign aid to the state should not be used in the future. These conditions hurt the state’s citizens and ultimately result in the West having to spend more money in the future to try to undo the damage they have done to Haiti.

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